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Polish Information Processing Society
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Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems, Volume 21

Proceedings of the 2020 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems

Developing Defense Strategies from Attack Probability Trees in Software Risk Assessment

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15439/2020F21

Citation: Proceedings of the 2020 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, M. Ganzha, L. Maciaszek, M. Paprzycki (eds). ACSIS, Vol. 21, pages 527–536 ()

Full text

Abstract. Since the introduction of the Measuring Instruments Directive 2014/32/EU, prototypes of measuring instruments subject to legal control in the European Union must be accompanied by a risk assessment, when being submitted for conformity assessment. Taximeters, water meters, electricity meters or fuel pumps form the basis for the economic sector usually known as Legal Metrology, where the development towards cheaper allpurpose hardware combined with more sophisticated software is imminent. Therefore, a risk assessment will always have to include software-related issues. Hitherto, publications about software risk assessment methods lack an efficient means to derive and assess suitable countermeasures for risk mitigation. To this end, attack trees are used in related research fields. In this paper, defense probability trees are derived from attack probability trees, well-suited to the requirements of software risk assessment and used to identify optimal sets of countermeasures. The infamous Meltdown vulnerability is used to highlight the experimental application of the method.

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